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Rev. Scully. Professor Chen, you did not disappoint us. Thank you
very much for a stimulating lecture and a fine beginning to our
conference.
Let me, if I may, from my very limited perspective as a political scientist, and even more limited perspective as a student of
Latin American politics, respond briefly to some of the points you
raised. While I am not an expert in the area of international law,
the key protagonist in your talk -seemed to me to be the nation
state, and it would not be appropriate to have our guests come to
a Catholic university without some reflection on our ambiguous,
historic relationship with this invention of Northwest European
countries in the 17th Century. The development of the nation
state as a political entity is, of course, tightly linked to socio-economic processes occurring in that part of the world, and really
only in that part of the world, for the period of several centuries.
The nation state as a political entity in the northwest comer
of Europe during those centuries was a distinctive form of political
domination-or set of dominations-that was lirked to a process
of modernization. It was also linked to cultural and economic
changes that I think need to be included when we consider the
goal of nation state builders to suppress subnational loyalties. As
you noted in your lecture, the nation state as a political entity
really did not crystallize in the so-called Third World until after
the Second World War in 1945. The nation state having been, in
a sense, invented by the bourgeoisie in Northwest Europe, did not
become a reality in the Third World and to those developing
countries until much later.
Nation state builders are faced with a set of dilemmas when
building a nation. There are obvious normative claims as to the
desirability of building a nation. You pointed out several of the
problem areas. First of all, and perhaps foremost, is the problem
of forging identity-forging a set of identities that is coherent.
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Next, is the problem of legitimacy--making the nation and the
form of domination which the nation state implies a legitimate
form of domination. There is also the problem of penetration,
namely, penetrating that national territory with state agencies that
effectively carry out policy.
The second part of that tension, however, is that another set
of tasks, not so much support-generatingtasks for nation state builders, but demand-generating tasks, appear. And those are, as you
pointed out towards the end of your talk, participationand distribution-very different tasks with very different implications.
Let us focus on this particular concept, the nation, la
naci6n-what O'Donnell calls "the network of solidarities imposed
upon the diversity and antagonisms of society." Note that there is
a presumption that society is basically antagonistic and diverse and
that a network of solidarity is imposed upon that essential diversity
in order to build a nation.
The extension of the nation, that network of solidarities in
the nation state as we conceive it and as your normative focus
implies, also implies extending citizenship-that is formal or procedural equality together with what we call, at least in Latin American Politics, lo popular, not just procedural, formal equality, but
real claims to substantive equality.
These elements are mediating mechanisms. They are mediating mechanisms (the nation, citizenship, lo popular) with the nation state at the center. They are, however, absolutely essential if
the nation state and the political regime that is at its center are to
be able to claim legitimacy.
When identity is not established, or in an authoritarian situation, as in Latin America in the last decade, in which the network
of solidarity called la naci6n is subverted, the flag becomes the
sign of the anti-nation (as we see in the Baltic republics today).
Until recently, to sing the National Anthem in a poor area of
Chile was a reason to be stoned-literally stonedl This occurs
because coercion becomes the predominant force binding the
nation when those fundamental solidarities are not present. So,
the tension is very common in developing countries and parts of
the developed world. In larger, multi-national states in which citizens do not hold the nation as the primary source, or focus, or
locus of loyalties, but rather sub-national claims hold those loyalties, the result is the disintegration of the ability to govern-witness Liberia, the most recent dramatic example of this
phenomenon.
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On the other hand, while those larger states may be economically viable, at the other extreme we face the possibility, of a proliferation of mini-states that may enjoy this solidaristic cohesiveness
called the nation, but are simply not viable economically.
Perhaps the set of solutions lies in what Arend Lijphart has
called consociational formulas, in which national groups are living
side by side, but have certain minimal guarantees to ensure their
autonomy and cultural viability.
In any case, it seems to me that "who gets what, when, and
how" continues to be a helpful heuristic device for answering
these questions.
Professor Chen: I think what you just said certainly points to the real
complexities and the real heart of the problem. I did not have
time to elaborate on the role of the nation state. When I speak in
terms of the first category of national claims, that, in a sense, has
to do with the establishment of the nation state. Other speakers,
of course, will address arrangements falling short of that.
I think one of the most remarkable developments in international law is the notion that international law is not centered on
the nation state. The nation state remains the primary participant,
but there are other actors, many other participants. My book, An
Introduction to Contemporary International Law, really tries to emphasize throughout that nation states remain the most important
participants, but that other non-state entities, and even individuals,
become very important.
International governmental organizations, sometimes called
super-national organizations, play increasingly important functions.
And international private associations, pressure groups, business
associations, and multinational corporations are all performing
roles, possessing assets that exceed the sum of the states. And
most especially, the role of the individual is increasing. The individual human being is considered to be at the very heart of this
whole process; that'is what our international law is all about.
At one time in the past, international law was discussed in
terms of the nation state as the only and exclusive subject of international law. Other entities or individuals were simply objects.
The New Haven School really tried to get away from this dich6tomy of a subject/object to see who the actual actors and participants 'are in the global functions of decision making.
In that sense, one can see that the nation state would continue to be very important to the extent that it continues to fulfill
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the aspirations of legitimacy-in the sense that people in the past
assumed nation states would be the framework that would give
that fulfillment to the individual. When the state itself becomes
oppressive, however, it is contrary, counterproductive, to what
people demand. So, I think one can look to a future in which the
nation state will continue to play an important role, but other
non-state participants, including individuals, will also play important roles.
I do not think it is sound to focus only on the nation state
when speaking about certain ethnic minority groups. They demand more protection, more fulfillment of different values. What
sort of arrangement can they find? If the nation state happens to
be the framework through which they can find that kind of satisfaction, then fine; but often it is not.
In that sense, one can see a wide range of actors performing
various functions in global decision making.
Participant Do you foresee a subunit of nation states becoming
more important players in the development of world public order?
In your talk you spoke of some sort of halfway house between
complete independence and some lesser kind of autonomy that
groups could have within nation states. Could those groups potentially become international players? And if they do, will they compete with the nation state? In addition, how will they become players? Can they become players in international organizations and
such?
Professor Chen: I think they will become important players. Actually,
they have more demands, and this is what we call "the new era of
democracy." People are saying they want to participate in the
shaping and sharing of power and want to manage affairs that
directly affect their own destiny-take for example, Quebec and
Puerto Rico. They asked whether there would be alternatives short
of the present arrangement, and short of a full fledged of independence. Quebec wants to have many of the functions performed
by the federal government moved to the individual provinces.
Obviously, our neighbor will have to work that out. It is not going
to be an easy process, but there is such a demand.
In the case of Puerto Rico, there was, at first, every expectation that Congress would pass a resolution to enable Puerto Rico
to have a referendum this year. The House and Senate obviously
disagree on whether the referendum should have binding effect
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on Congress or simply serve as some sort of indication of whether
the people there would choose to maintain the status quo, the
present commonwealth status, or seek statehood or independence.
Even those who subscribe to this notion of the present commonwealth status-which, everything considered, seems to have
very considerable benefits-feel that it may be best to have greater
participation within the framework of the United States by being
part of the United States-a free, associated state, but with greater
participation in the external arenas.
Actually, Michael Reisman undertook a study for the American Society sometime ago, which he examined what sort of external participation could be allowed for certain representations in
the United Nations-different governments or organizations, especially OAS, or other comparable arenas-so that they could be
part of the United States, but also participate and contribute more
effectively externally. Consider also the situation in Yugoslavia, or
the talk of loose confederations of the Soviet Union.
I think all of these examples very strongly indicate that people
would participate. They want to make certain that their participation in the processes that affect their future can be established,
both in terms of what is going on within their own borders and
beyond.
Participan- Can you foresee independent consulates being sent by
subdivisions of states for trade purposes or something of that
kind? For example, in Quebec, a Quebec consulate for trade in
addition to a Canadian one?
P ofessor Chen: This is why I think an arrangement falling short of
independence would require a great deal of creativity and ingenuity. Professor Hannum addresses this issue quite a bit in his book.
Short of independent status, what kind of arrangements can be
made? I think that an independent consulate created for the purpose of allowing a city to economically participate in external
trade and investment relationships certainly would be feasible. But
this depends, of course, upon the actual situation. The situation in
Quebec will be different from some others. I think, however, it is
very important for all of the parties involved to see that there is a
common interest: they have common stakes, and they can work
within an open, peaceful process. Then, they can work out what
their common interests are, and so on.
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I think this is what is remarkable about a democracy. When
you have that kind of open, democratic process, even though it
may be a very painful and protracted process, different interests'
demands can be worked out within the framework of realizing the
common interest.
Participant I would like to make a very short remark about the
nation state. I think it would be interesting to discuss whether the
nation state as developed in the 19th Century with the influence
of German romanticism was not really a sort of distortion of the
original nation state subject. That is something a bit out of the
context here.
As to Professor Chen's lecture, I was very glad that at the end
you said that self-determination was not limited to the colonial
context. I think that was one of the major shortcomings of the
self-determination discussion of up to ten years ago. Coming from
a place [Germany] which is much more legalistic or positive than
your New Haven, I would rather have the problem lean not so
much to a value system, but to the antagonism between self-determination and territorial integrity.
There again, I think we have one of the problems of the
present international law: that is, the subjects of international law
are states, not people. I think that is something we ought to
change. I do not think that we can say, with the actual state of
the law, that nations, as such, are already subjects of international
law. I think we have to change that.
And now I get into something which is closer to more internal stability. I think the stability of frontiers and state borders has
become something like the holy cow of international law, starting
from the decommunization process in Latin America. This doctrine was then taken over to Africa, where, in my opinion, it simply does not work. And we now have such a situation in central
Eastern Europe and Southeastern Europe. You might call the
Soviet Union one of the last lonely empires.
Anyway, we will be back in the colonial context, and that does
not work. I think we have to come to a position where we can say
that the right to self-determination will prevail over the interest of
the state as to territorial integrity. I think that, in the end, would
lead to much more stability. On the flight from Bangkok to Chicago, I read in the paper that the Luxembourg Foreign Secretary
just said the EEC was not welcoming the secession of Slovenia
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because they were afraid of destabilization. That, I think, is completely wrong.
We will have much more destabilization in the Baltics in
Southeastern Europe if we do not respond to these demands for
self-determination. There again I think we do meet the value system. And my approach is that we should turn the balance more,
or very differently, in order to give the right of self-determination
more importance than the interest of the state as to stability, and
territorial integrity, which, obviously, is not as well principled in
international law. Thank you.
Professor Chen: I think this is really at the very heart of the matter.
For instance, in terms of the basic policy of how territorial integrity and freedom of choice or self-determination can be reconciled,
the Declaration on Decolorization expresses the basic right to selfdetermination, among other things, but also discourages disintegration of the particular state. In other words, the territory is
inviolable. So we have this question of stability and
change-stability and freedom of choice. How can they be reconciled? My basic recommendation suggests that it does require a
contextual analysis of the different factors involved, especially in
terms of the probable consequences. When Slovenia or other
Baltic states make a choice, for instance, the considerations as to
what might be the probable consequences for the Baltic states or
the rest of the Soviet Union, and what might be the implications
for the regional community and even world public order as a
whole should be addressed.
It is a difficult task. It is no mean task, but it is very important to realize that when a choice of that magnitude is made, it
does generate effects far beyond the borders of one state or one
particular group or territory involved. And in that sense, many
different factors need to be taken into account.
One of the most significant changes in the decades after the
creation of the United Nations certainly has been the notion that
people. are fundamental-people are paramount, not territory. I
remember the very eloquent words used by Judge Dillard in the
Western Sahara case. He said that in the ultimate sense, people
are paramount as sovereign, not the territory. This is really the
essence of what we mean when we talk about a piece of territory
or the status of a particular piece of territory. Even border matters
have to be viewed in light of what the implications may be for the
people directly involved. What effect? What will the consequences
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be in terms of their basic decision-making processes, internally and
externally? How will it affect the aggregate of patterns, or the
value distribution, and so on?
And so, that certainly is a very critical point.
Rev. Scully. We have five minutes remaining in the session. So, I
would ask our questioners to be as brief as possible please.
Participant: Let me first say that I like the word "self-determination." However, the way international lawyers use it, sometimes I
feel that its clarity is inversely proportionate to its popularity. And
this is partly because there is no normative theory of self-determination. I detected that Professor Chen had a normative theory, at
the beginning at least: that of consent. That people who do not
consent can live with the obligation is a matter of consent. And
then you want them to have a balancing act which says that of
course there are other factors one has to weigh-is it viable, does
it create problems for its neighbors? But that does not seem to be
a normative theory; that is a balancing act. And the concept of
consent is gone. Once you say that you have to balance those
factors, then consent does not carry much weight. It seems to me
that once one is engaged in balancing, one has to ask who does
the balancing. And it matters who determines whether something
is viable or not.
Rev. Scully: Could I ask you to take a few questions and then to
respond?
Professor Chen: All right.
Participant Thank you. I would like to follow up on a point just
made. I am a legal anthropologist who is turning into an anthropological lawyer, and my comment and question follow from that
prospective.
When you mentioned viability and responsibility, I think I
could suggest that under that criteria the United States itself
might be the least viable, the least responsible. After all, it is more
economically dependent on resources outside its borders than any
other union in the world system. As for responsibility, I would
point to the last two major wars, in Vietnam and the Gulf, and
question whether the U.S.'s role was particularly responsible. I am
saying that the application of those criteria is problematic.
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The other comment relates to your enumeration of self-determination issues on the table right now. In talking about the Americas, I was surprised that you picked out Quebec and Puerto Rico
and totally passed over the entire Aboriginal nations' claims. That,
in turn, illustrates the problem with this so-called universalistic
set of criteria you set up, which is not at all universalistic, but
liberal-western in tradition, because that was at play in Canada
when the claims of hundreds of Aboriginal nations were not attended to, but the western-liberal claim put out by Quebec totally
dominated the Mechlin courts.
So, I would like to have you comment on this very difficult
tension that Mr. Addis first brought up.
Rev. Scully I may ask you to endure one more question.
Partidpant I have a very short question related to who has and
who has not the right to self-determination. If the right to self-determination is jus cogens, it seems to me the question is not really
a question because every ethnic group who has a declared right to
self-determination has, at least in this interpretation, a right to
self-determination.
The second short question: If there is in some way inherent
tension between the right to self-determination of individuals and
the right to self-determination of the group, how can you articulate who has which kind of right?
Professor Chen: Alright. (Laughter). It will require several hours. My
initial presentation obviously did not clarify the matter.
First of all, this notion about a balancing act: I try to shy away
from balancing in the sense that you try to balance one end of
the scale and the other end. But when somebody is trained in a
policy oriented approach, a configurated policy science approach,
the emphasis is that in a particular situation, all the factors relevant in the context need to be taken into account. And the significance of one factor is a function of the context involved. So
when you talk about self-determination, yes, I emphasize throughout, it is deeply rooted in the notion of human dignity, human
rights, human freedom, aspiration for association with groups,
identification with groups that can fulfill their demands for protection of values, and fulfillment of their values.
And so, in terms of basic preference, there is a presumptive
weight in favor of a group demanding to self-determine, to man-
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age its own affairs, to become master of its own destiny. But, to be
very realistic, in the real world, if we begin to say that every group
that wants self-determination can have it, then we are going to
have real fragmentation. I remember days ago, when I had a
chance to lunch together with Professor Myres McDougal, we
talked about self-determination in the Baltic states, and he did not
feel the way I feel. I strongly feel that they should be given support, and he said, 'Well, self-determination for Mississippi, I'm all
for it" I said, "That's a very different situation." He asked "Why
are they different?" I said, "People in Mississippi are very happy
and content to live within the framework of the United States,
even though the scars of the war among the states continue, to
linger on for some people." In terms of the intensity of the land
separation, for independent identity I think one is really a far cry
from the other.
So, I think this is a very real consideration in the sense of
what I meant by complementality. On the one hand, aggression is
impermissible under international law, but, on the other, self defense is permissible. Not every use of force is the same, as was
very clearly demonstrated in the Persian Gulf situation. Not every
use of a force is to be viewed with the same degree of value and
justification. And this is why, when we talk about use of force in
international law, there is permissible use of force, impermissible
use of force, and the question of how they are to be distinguished
to fulfill the common interest. I think the common interest is the
ultimate guide. Common interest, as I identified on the global
level, refers to world order. It is very different from President
Bush's emphasis, but it is an order. The notion of a world public
order certainly has been a trademark of McDougal's and Lasswell's
books, in collaboration with their associates. Human Rights and
World Public Order and The World Public Order and the Space have two
distinctive dimensions, one of which is minimum world order, in
the sense of minimization of unauthorized coercion and violence.
The other is optimum world order, in the sense of the widest
possible shaping and sharing values. Coercion that is authorized
for the purposes of vindicating justice or repelling aggression is a
far cry from force used for the purposes of naked aggression and
conquest. Thus, I suggest that we have a contextual framework of
analysis which allows one to increase the degree of rationality in
decision making, instead of saying "Oh, yes, decisions about selfdetermination are just political decisions," and then forget about
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We try to say, "Yes, common interests are at stake." And we
try to determine how that common interest can be phrased in
terms of minimal world order and optimum world order, creating
conditions that would allow development, justice, and human
rights to prevail. So, it is not only in the negative sense of absence
of aggression, absence of the use of armed force, but also in
terms of creating conditions that will enable every group, every
people to find real fulfillment. In today's world, that fulfillment
would not necessarily be in the form of independence only. There
are other arrangements. And you say that international lawyers are
confused about self-determination. Well, self-determination has
been used by so many people for different purposes.
Self-determination is extremely attractive in its popular use,
but people use it to refer to very different situations, different demands. That is why I took the trouble at the very outset to say,
self-determination, as I focus upon it in my presentation, is the
claim relating to the establishment of a new state.
And when I listed some of the notable examples of the people demanding self-determination, I thought Puerto Rico and
Quebec would be very interesting in this context. I said the list
can really go on and on. Those are not exhaustive.
The question about indigenous populations definitely has
been discussed very much under this doctrine label of "self-determination." But what those rights should be has certainly been a
subject of concern on the part of the United Nations Human
Rights Commission and the United Nations as a whole. I believe
some speakers will be addressing that. And I think that is an important part: to an extent, they do demand to establish a new
state. They do present very peculiar situations. And here I think it
underscores one fundamental dilemma in the area of international
protection of human rights. International human rights law after
World War II emphasized that as long as we protect the rights of
the individual, then there should be no complaining. But now,
what emerges is the idea that those human rights that are collectively demanded by groups, indigenous populations, are one type
of demand. There are others, and we must determine how those
particular demands can be given expression, either in the form of
independence or far short of that. What kind of a special autonomous protection will be given? The kind of cultural right or special protection that is to be accorded really is something I think
experts can work out, making certain that whatever arrangements
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are made would enhance human dignities for the people most
directly involved and for others.
Finally, I will address the question of the principle of selfdetermination as jus cogens. Some international lawyers take that
position. Jus cogens means that these are norms that are so fundamentally, so intensely demanded that they cannot be derogated.
Some people call it "peremptory norms." And yes, this particular
view has gained a good deal of support in terms of the general
principle, the general doctrine of self-determination. But the real
difficulty again comes at the time of application. How can this
general, abstract principle be related to a concrete case in which a
particular group invoked the name of self-determination?
Well, the answer is not "yes and no," "your request granted or
not granted." It involves more, and it also underscores the very
fact that the world community remains decentralized. That is to
say, individual states make decisions whether to support peoples or
not. For instance, as to the Baltic states, only Iceland has stuck its
neck out to extend recognition. Other countries are sympathetic,
but not quite willing to go that far, showing that when a particular
group is struggling to achieve independence, struggling to achieve
freedom, it requires lots of international support, and whether
that support would be forthcoming or not often is a matter of
very critical decisions.
The nation state power elites consider what the implication
will be in their own backyards. There is this notion that the nation state borders, even though inherited from the colonial past,
are fundamentally very sacred. And territorial integrity, in terms of
maintaining the new borders established after World War II, in
general, certainly has gained very wide acceptance. But the question is: How should this actual application be effected? If you use
particular case studies, then it would be even more difficult. But I
would simply emphasize that when we talk about a new world
order to come, that doctrine, the principle of self-determination,
will have an important role to play.
If we can clarify what may be a state and, in a particular
context, take into account the common interest of all the different
parties and all the different communities that may be affected, we
would most likely enhance the degree of rationality and optimize
the common interest of all.

